

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**Routing Slip**

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12	Compt				
13	D/EEO				
14	D/Pers				
15	D/OEA				
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Remarks:

Executive Secretary

7/11/83

Date

2637 (10-81)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMATION

JUL 1983

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
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



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July 8, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN N. McMAHON
Deputy Director for Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: National Intelligence Topics (U)

During the past few months, we have reviewed the anticipated intelligence requirements of Judge Clark and the NSC Staff over the next 12 months. The following identifies several general areas of major interest, as well as several specific topics: (C)

1. We need additional information on the key vulnerabilities of our adversaries. (S)

a. The internal economic, military, and political vulnerabilities of the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Cuba, China, Vietnam, Libya. (S)

b. Their vulnerabilities abroad; i.e., in Africa, the Middle East, Central America. (S)

Precise definitions of these vulnerabilities will be useful to policy formulation and would suggest methods of enhancing US interests. For example, identification of Soviet negotiating or diplomatic positions which (a) provide us with possible political or strategic advantages, or (b) with opportunities for US public diplomacy, would be particularly valuable over the next 12 months. (S)

2. We should identify opportunities for advancing US interests in dealing with adversaries [redacted] quite apart from efforts to identify and block our adversaries' foreign policy initiatives. We need much more precise information on which foreign leaders, groups, or factions are favorably disposed to the US and our interests. What can we expect of them and how can we enhance their effectiveness? We need much more precise information on diplomatic, political, economic and military incentives which we can offer [redacted] foreign leaders or which we can deny them, as the circumstances warrant. This will facilitate

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a broad range of policy decisions, ranging from Presidential meetings and trip planning to various diplomatic negotiations, and eventually it could contribute to long-term policy formulation. Also, in general, we believe that the priority categories for this type of political intelligence should be upgraded in the NITs and DCID 1/2. (S)

3. We need much more information on the internal dynamics, objectives and programs of foreign intelligence services. Several major issues over the past few years have revolved around the role of these services, and particularly around what their activities tell us about foreign government intentions. Among these issues have been the attempted assassination of the Pope, the role of the KGB in the peace movements in Europe and the US, and the role of non-Soviet intelligence services in opposition to our Central American policy. (S)

We specifically request more information on the objectives and activities of foreign services, particularly Bloc and other hostile services (e.g., the Nicaraguans) in the US. In general, we believe consideration should be given to upgrading the collection priority on all hostile services. (S)

In general, we have been assisted greatly by factual information on military and economic matters and realize that these are very important priorities. We understand that if everything becomes a priority, nothing is. Nevertheless, we request that collection of "political intelligence" be upgraded qualitatively and quantitatively. (S)

Please see attachment for specific NITs. (C)



Robert C. McFarlane
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Attachment

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1. What major Soviet internal and external vulnerabilities lend themselves to exploitation by the US over the next 12 months? (S)

a. Military - e.g., exploitation of captured Soviet equipment and personnel in Afghanistan, Africa. (S)

b. Economic - e.g., need for food and technology, hard currency.

c. Political - e.g., worker dissatisfaction in Poland and in regions adjacent to Poland; Soviet involvement in the internal affairs of other states; Soviet intransigence in arms control negotiations. (S)

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3. Delineate the likely activities (targets, strategies, tactics) and effectiveness of foreign intelligence services within the US over the next 12 months, including the KGB and the Bloc services, the Nicaraguans, the PRC, [redacted] and other major services. What are their major weaknesses and how could we exploit them?

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4. Evaluate the specific objectives and expectations of key foreign leaders in their relations with the US over the next 12 months. (S)

a. Soviet and important Bloc leaders. (S)

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c. Leaders the President is likely to meet over the next 12 months. (While not all visits have been announced, several can be anticipated, and others can be evaluated later.) (S)

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5. The resolution of the POW/MIA issue is one of highest national priority for this Administration. Vigorous efforts should be expanded to discover whether Americans still are being held captive in Indochina. What collection problems must be overcome? (S)

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